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3INTRODUCTION
Economic relations of the United States with the Middle East are
dominated by the production and export of petroleum. Perhaps our most
important contribution to understanding this market is negative. If we
can show up the non-problems, we can face the real problems--like
Columbus, unafraid of falling off the edge of a flat earth, and ready to
tackle the hazards of a long voyage into uncharted waters.
Foremost among the non-problems-is the shortage or "gap" between oil
supply and demand. Once we get rid of this ghost, we are also rid of
"access," "availability," "long-term assurance of supply" and that
cherished phantom, the "special relationship" of the United States and
Saudi Arabia. They'are all fictions. But belief in fiction is a fact,
and the belief does us no good and much harm.
The meaning of short.-e. Policy makers in consuming countries are
firmly convinced of a great oil shortage coming. In 1972, the State
Department predicted a shortage of 20 million barrels daily (MBD) by
1980; indeed by 1976 our position "could be nothing short of desperate."
Of course, in 1973, "exaggerated talk of an energy crisis greatly
strengthened the bargaining power of the Arab states." International
Energy Agency (IEA) predicts a world oil shortage of only 14 MD-in 1985;
more recently, and more modestly, of 8 MBD-(plus or minus 4).1 We
1New York Times, May 27, 1972; Oil & Gas Journal, May 15, 1972;
Petroleum Economist, November 1973; New York Times, March 17, 1977,
Petroleum Economist, September, 1978.
4car-c Iegin to count the recent warnings of "catastrophe" and "crisis"
in the mid-1980s as "the world's oil wells start to run dry and a
physical scramble for energy develops."1
The "gap" is like the horizon, always receding as we go toward it.
A shortage persisting for months or years can exist when, and only
when, the price is held persistently below the level that would clear the
market and equate demand with supply. The natural gas shortage in the
United States is the outstanding example.
When the market does not clear, the product is allocated not by
price but by favor and influence, or public authority. Some buyers get
more than they want, others must shut down factories, stop motor
vehicles, shiver in the dark. Unless prevented by government, the seller
can extort all kinds of conditions over and above the price.
But persistent shortage is impossible in world oil because nobody
has the power and the wish to hold the price of oil below the
market-clearing level. To believe in a persistent or chronic gap, one
must assume that the sellers will, year in year out, insist on giving
away a large fraction of the money they could make. Even if the producer
nations were so foolish, product prices would soar, with huge profits to
refiners and marketers. The producers would promptly capture those
profits by raising crude oil prices.
But if oil is allocated by price, there is no shortage, and favor
and influence are worthless. During the so-called "embargo" of 1973-74,
1New York Times, October 6, 1977. The phrase "scramble for scarce
petroleum supplies" occurs in the Wall Street Journal and in a New York
Times editorial, both October 7.
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we had a clear "special relationship" with Saudi Arabia: their special
enemy. Let us see what difference t actually made.
Lessons of the "embargo." The Arab producers cut back output,
thereby inflicting economic injury on the whole consuming world. The
"embargo" against the United States and the Netherlands was a sham, even
if we disregard evasion and transshipment, because non-Arab production
exceeded U.S. imports, as it still does. As Arab oil was diverted from
the United States elsewhere, non-Arab oil was diverted from elsewhere to
the United States: a swap of customers. In theory, in any place where
total supply (imported plus domestic) diminished more, the price would
rise more. The higher price would be a magnet to draw in more supply
until prices equalized again. Since everyone in the trade knew this,
there would be a continuous shift to American customers, with the
reduction in total supply at every moment tending to be the same
everywhere. This actually happened. Non-Arab producers did well by
doing god, diverting oil to "embargoed" countries. The oil companies
deserve credit for working out the complex logistics of swapping
customers, but not for the inevitable result: everybody suffering
roughly the same reduction. Comparisons are very inexact, but if we take
actual oil consumption versus an estimate of what it would have been,
absent the cutbacks: Japan lost only 3 percent, the special enemy
(United States) lost 11 percent, Western Europe lost 19 percent,
including "preferred," "friendly" Britain and France, 12 and 21 percent.
Or comparing actual consumption in January-April 1974 with the same
months of 1973: the United States lost 7 percent, Japan actually gained
61 percent, Western Europe lost 11 percent.1
Another test is the draw-down of crude oil and product inventories
in nine large consuming countries, from end-September 1973 to end-March
1974. The reduction in this country was 4 percent. Three countries did
better, and five worse, including the British (11 percent) and French (12
percent).2 That was the benefit of their "special relationship."
The myth of "access," "assurance of adequate supply," etc. The
embargo was a very severe test and proof: "access" is a non-problem.
All a buyer needs is access to enough money to pay for the oil. Some
Middle East producers spit venom at the United States. Others profess to
like us, mostly. Neither attitude has any effect on oil supply and price.
Our policy makers live in a different world. Its feverish
poliLical-dramatic atmosphere is conveyed perfectly by a high ranking
official: "It's hard to bare our teeth at the Arabs when we're groveling
for their oil." 3 Which is more undignified--and irrelevant--baring
one's teeth or groveling? Be that as it may; one doesn't see much with
belly to the ground.
But the "groveling" is only one side of the coin; the other is an
ego trip for the statesman. By his skillful diplomacy, his masterful
1Robert B. Stobaugh, The Oil Companies in Crisis," Daedalus, Fall 1975,
p. 202. Federal Energy Administration, Office of International Energy
Affairs, "U.S. Oil Companies and the Arab Oil Embargo: The International
Allocation of Constricted Supplies," prepared for the use of the
Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Session (1975), p. 8.
2National Foreign Assessment Center, International Energy Statistical
Review, May 17, 1978, p. 19.
3Direct uotation, in Wall Street Journal, October 21, 1977, article on
editorial page.
7blending of firmness and conciliation, he will induce the producers,
particularly Saudi Arabia, to produce "enough to meet our needs." The
truth is, no matter what the Saudis and others produce, the price will
rise high enough to where anybody paying it can have all he wants.
Conversely, whatever-the price, at that price the amount supplied will
equal the amount demanded. So the producers will let us have "enough to
meet our needs," no matter how much they produce, at whatever price, with
whatever effects. The statesman assures us of "access" to "adequate
supplies" just as surely as the rooster's crowing brings up the sun, and
he believes in his mission with all the sincerity in roosterdom.
The harmful myth of the Saudi-U.S. "special relationship."
Consuming countries are worried that the United States will preempt Saudi
Arab output through the "special relationship," leaving them to bear the
burden of physical shortage, with all its costs in unemployment and
hardship. The fear of shortage explains the craving f-
self-sufficiency, incessantly confused with the safeguards against sudden
interruptions or cutbacks. One harmful result, to be explored later, is
the reluctance to produce oil or gas or uranium, in order to make sure
that there will be-"enough for our needs" in the 21st century, or the
hereafter. Wealthy countries like the United States, Canada, Australia,
and Norway, can afford this folly, but even the Indians abuse themselves
by-hoarding oil and coal in the ground, and importing high-price freign
supplies instead.1
1Economist, London, June 3, 1978, p. 87.
. .
8The second result of the delusion is more serious. The
Administration has urged our friends to delay the building of breeder
reactors and nuclear reprocessing plants. But "for Japan and West
European countries, most of which lack large supplies of coal and oil,
the ... breeder reactor is the principal hope of obtaining adequate
energy supplies."1 The key word is, as usual, "adequate," not
lower-cost. American assurances of future nuclear fuel supplies are
discredited by our shrill warnings of energy "shortage" and our refusal
to ship Alaskan oil to Japan. Here too the lesson of the "embargo" has
not been learned: an effective market makes it unimportant which
particular supplier ships to which particular customer--the matching or
pairing depends on what pattern of shipments is cheapest. Were there no
delusion of impending physical shortage, the refusal would appear as
senseless as in fact it is.
Yet the reluctance to export is logical. In a shortage, the real
value of the product, which is the price that would rule in an
uncontrolled market, is greater than the controlled price. It follows
that the buyer is paytng, and the seller is getting, less than the stuff
is really worth. To export it is a gift to the undeserving foreigner.
It is all a rational deduction from the unexamined premise of "shortage".
New York Times, October 4, 1977, p. 53, and also September 9, 1977.
See also the joint statement in Keidanren Review no. 43, February 1977,
by Federation of Economic Organizations, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum,
and Committee for Energy Policy Promotion: "...In view of the actions of
the oil producing countries in the Middle East, increasing imports of oil
by the U.S.A., and other trends, it is all too uncertain whether Japan
will be able to secure such a huge amount of petroleum." See also Michel
Grenon, Ce Monde Affame d'Eneraie (Paris, 1973); Guy de Carmoy, Energy
for Europe (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1977), pp. 37, 55,
80, 93, 117. It would be impossible to collect and list all these
worries about "adequate" supplies.
9Conclusion on "gaps" and "shortages" and "access." Nobody should,
though some will, misinterpret this paper as saying: "price will solve
the problem." Price is the problem--the only problem. We need to look
at the real world, where the forces of demand, supply, and monopoly
determine the price.
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II. WORLD OIL SUPPLY AND DEMAND
Background to forecasting.1 Oil consumption in the non-Communist
world (NCW) today is about 50 million barrels daily (MBD). See Table I.
It forms essentially one big market--as the "embargo" reminded us again.
The price at which oil crosses frontiers is everywhere the same, once we
allow for quality and location differentials. The Middle East (including
Libya and Algeria) is important because it has for some years accounted
for 45 percent of NCW output, not because it supplies much more of one
country's consumption (and less of another's).
Forecasting is an unavoidable, difficult exercise. Table I shows
the usual procedure. The first step is to estimate NCW Consumption,
usually at constant prices. The second is to estimate non-OPEC supply
(including the minor supplement of Communist exports), which is preferred
for reasons of security, lower cost, balance of payments, etc. Then net
demand on OPEC, line 5,.is a residual which may reflect and amplify all
the errors in the component series. The CIA calculation of net demand on
OPEC, 44 percent higher than the oil company's, is almc-t certainly far
wrong, bearing in mind both logical error and nearly two years'
experience. But far more important than who is right or wrong is to get
the concept straight. Demand on OPEC (line 5) sums up everything outside
the control of the cartel. OPEC supply is the cartel response: the
amount they choose to provide, to suit their interests. OPEC supply is
1 This section draws extensively on a paper "World Supply and Demand",
presented at the 50th Anniversary Meeting of the Canadian Society of
Petroleum Geologists (June 26, 1978), to be published by the Society.
.41
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Table I
Past and Projected Oil Consumption & Production
(in million barrels daily - includes natural gas liquids)
Historical
1977
(Prelim)
Jan.-
Sept.
1978
1985 Projections 
Central
Intelli-
gence
Agency
(CIA)
Oil
Co.
1. Total non-Communist1
2. Non-OPEC supply
3. Communist exports
4. Other output
5. Net demand on OPEC
(line 1 less line 2)
6. (Arab plus Iran output) (24.0) (25.1) (23.5)
7. OPEC capacity 37.7 38.9 39.9 38 sufficient
N.B. Detail may not add to total because of rounding.
* Not Stated
l.Inventory buildup or drawdown can make actual consumption vary as much
as 5 percent above or below this amount. The shorter the time period,
the greater the possible error.
2Assumed the same as 1977. For Soviet crude oil exports to Western
Europe, the largest single component, it is correct for the first half of
1978.
3Subsequently reduced to (-2.5).
Sources: Historical, CIA, except OPEC capacity, which is as estimated by
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, plus actual production of natural gas
liquids.
1973
49.5
18.2
1.0
17.2
31.3
50.8
19.0
1.6
17.4
31.8
50.1
20.4
1.62
18.8
29.6
70
21
-43
25
49
60
26
*34
*
34
(*) (*)
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not something immovable, to which we can adapt ourselves -- quite the
contrary.
Let us look first at total NCW consumption (line 1). From 1950 to
1973, NCW income increased around 5 percent annually, total energy use a
little less. Oil use grew about 7.5 percent per year, partly because it
was cheaper and displaced other fuels, partly because oil-using
activities (automobiles, trucks) grew faster than energy uses in
general. Middle East oil, the cheapest fuel, grew at 12 percent per
year. Since 1973, the economic growth rate has been around 2.5 percent
per year; energy about 1.2, oil almost flat. We trust this drab picture
will not continue long, and we will now try to "look through" it, to see
what we may reasonably expect as to non-Communist consumption, supply,
and the position of the OPEC producers, of which the Middle East is- the
greater part.
World economic growthwill probably be slower in the next decade
than up to 1973. We can set aside mythical energy or raw-material
"crises" and the more li'V-ely indirect effects of high oil prices, to be
discussed later. But countries outside North America will tend to
approach the American growth rate because they have accomplished certain
once-for-all changes. Much unproductive or semi-unemployed labor has
been moved off marginal farms and out of marginal retailing-artisan jobs
into productive industry. Women have moved into the paid labor force.
Population growth in the developed countries is today barely positive,
and still decreasing. Catching-up with the more productive North
13
American economies has been slowing down. Productivity has everywhere
decreased its growth rate. All in all, disturbing influences aside, one
would expect worldwide long-term economic growth, after 1972, to approach
the American long-term growth rate, 3.5 percent per year. To take the
strongest case: of the sources of Japanese growth of 9.56 percent per
year in 1961-71, 3.24 percent points are "sustainable", 6.32 are
"transitional. 1
Income-energy-price relations determine consumption. Much is made
today of the incremental energy elasticity, i.e. the percent change in
energy use related to the percent change in national income. For various
countries, these ratios scatter all over the place, and it really makes
no sense to compare increment with increment. During 1973-77, for
example, energy use in the U.K. declined somewhat, while income'grew
somewhat. Surely nobody will apply this coefficient to forecast that the
higher the income, the lo,er the consumption.
But it makes sense to compare the ratio of total energy use to total
income, and changes in that ratio. In effect, we hold income constant
and ask for the effects of changed prices or other factors. Between 1972
and 1977 in the big consuming countries (U.S., Canada, Japan, E.E.C.),
energy use per unit of gross national product decreased about 8.0
percent, with very little variatiom among countries.(2) A pretty mild
response, but then the stimulus was not all that strong. We talk about
1Edward F. Denison and William K. Chungq How Japan's Economy Grew So
Fast (Washington, Brookings, 1976), p.116.
2Energy consumption, from BP Statistical Review 1977; real GNP from
Economic Report of the President 19//.
I
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the crude oil price quadrupling. (In fact it increased by a factor of
nearly 14 in 1970-77.) But the inflation-adjusted or real" price of oil
products, to consumers, has risen surprising little--roughly 60 percent.
This severe damping is because "real" transportation and refining costs,
and "real" consumer-country taxes, have been stable or even declining.
This result is consistent with the work of the M.I.T. world oil
project, with which I am associated. If we hold energy prices constant
in relation to prices of other factors of production--labor and
capital--and of all other objects of consumption--food, clothing,
shelter, etc.--then the demand for energy increases a little bit less
than the growth in world incomes.
If we hold income constant, the consumption of energy is strongly
affected by the price. Everybody knows that the amount of energy
consumed per unit of national product varies greatly. We are often
admonished to look at how the Swedes and West Germans, with allegedly the
same income per head (actually, about a fourth less), tise so much less
energy. If we dump out the moralistic exhortation, and just look at the
facts, we can account for much of these differences in consumption
patterns by variations in price.
But the price effects work slowly. First there is advice: turn
down the thermostats, turn off the lights, call off the trip. Then we
get down to business: change the capital stock of energy-using
equipment. First retrofitting: insulate buildings and machines; install
heat exchangers, sensing devices and computer controls to save energy and
increase its use only where and when and as it is needed; and so on.
Even more important is to design and construct new buildings and
15
equipment. The new Citicorp building in New York will use about half the
energy a building of equal size would have a few years ago. But new
buildings, and the new plant and equipment installed in a year, are a
very small percent of the total in use. Of course, automobiles turn over
a lot more rapidly than buildings. But the consumers are not nearly as
quick to look to money savings, and they do not design automobiles, nor
negotiate with designers. The half-life of the energy-saving process
should approximate that of the capital stock, and be in the region of
seven to ten years.
For the large industrial countries, as just seen, energy use per
unit of national product has been declining by 1.67 percent per year
(i.e., .98335 = .9192). If incomes grow at 3.5 percent per year,
energy use will grow around 2 percent (1.035 x .9833 = 1.018). But the
decline in the energy-inccme ratio will in time slow down.1 Oil use
should grow a bit more slowly than total energy use. Of course, the
precision of these or any other numbers is apparent not real. But the
oil-company forecast of oil consumption in 1985 is at least compatible
with what we know; the CIA's is not. Oil consumption growth will not
much exceed a third of the pre-1973 rate.
We should also, but have not yet, factored in: further crude oil
price increases, to be discussed below; consumer-country conservation
regulations, the only important example thus far being U.S. gasoline
mileage requirements; or consumer-country tax increases, or equivalent.
The requirement that a consumer use a second- or third-choice fuel (or a
1
"World Supply and Demand,"op. cit. App. 1.
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more expensive energy-saving automobile) raises his energy costs and has
the same effect as a tax, but it is politically acceptable because it
doesn't look like a tax.
Whatever the level of demand, providing adequate reserves is no
problem. Sheik Yamani; who is not expected to understate consumption
growth, has forecast a 47 percent rise in OPEC output in 1977-87.1
That is cumulative output of 136 billion barrels. OPEC proved reserves
end-1977 were 449 billion. Even assuming no discoveries, the amount of
reserves that could be added in known Middle East fields alone was
estimated in 1975 as between 300 and 550 billion.2 But reserves
available will not necessarily become actual reserves and producing
capacity; moreover, capacity does not necessarily mean production. It is
time to ask what governs the supply of crude oil.
The often upside-down world of supply. The world of demand is
orderly. Higher incomes mean more energy consumed; hinher prices mean
less.
In contrast, the supply response to higher prices is almost wildly
diverse, because it is often deflected or governed by political forces.
In some places, higher prices tend to bring forth more supply, in some
1H.E. Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, "Keynote Address," 50th Anniversary
Meeting of the Canadian Society of Petroleum Geologists (June 26, 1978),
to be published by the Society.
2Z.R. Beydoun and H.V. Dunnington, The Petroleum eology and Resources
of the iddle East (London: Scientific Press Ltd. 1975), p. 84. Compare
the estimate of 550 billion barrels by 1935 in fields known in 1970.
M.A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1972), p.71.
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places definitely less. And in any given country that relation will
change over time.
Canada supplies a cautionary tale. The 1973 price increase promised
a surge in industry profits, intolerable to public opinion. The province
of Alberta and the federal government were between them claiming rather
more than 100 percent. So we witnessed the rather amazing spectacle of a
steep decline in Canadian drilling. The governments relented, and now
drilling is up sharply. Some large gas discoveries have been made, but
actual reserves have not increased as much as they could because the
national government wants to hoard gas to insure "enough for our needs,"
thereby discouraging exploration and development. The huge heavy-oil
deposits (one trillion barrels in place) are now definitely worth
developing at current prices. This is the payoff to a decade of R&D
work.. But until a tax system is decided, there will be no production.
In the United States, there has been a continuing rise in drilling.
But price controls have almost certainly prevented it from being as great
as it might have been, and have turned it to less productive uses. Half
of the "windfall profits" would go to the Treasury, bt we seem willing
to give them up to prevent the oilmen from getting the other half.
Possibly even more important has been the reluctance to allow leasing for
exploration in new areas, partly because of genuine concern for the
environment, but partly for fear that somehow the oil companies are going
to reap indecent profits from these new areas. Since competitive bidding
is an efficient way of getting above normal profits for the Treasury,
this fear makes no sense at all.
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There have been similar developments in other countries of private
enterprise, such as Australia. In Great Britain the goal is
self-sufficiency.1 Then the higher the price, the less is demanded,
and the less supplied. Norway, a small democratic country, wished to
limit the impact of overflowing oil revenues. Hence there was a strict
relationship: the higher the price, the less the leasing. But Norwegian
oil and gas production is proving less than expected, they have overspent
expected revenues, and now they are stepping up leasing and exploration.
Here as elsewhere, foreign exchange deficits and resulting external debt
service have been the most important single factor in turning a country's
policy around.
In Indonesia, the price explosion led to huge profits for a national
company, which led to profligate waste. The receiver in bankruptcy, the
government, was in dire need of cash, and carried through a unilateral
revision of its contracts with foreign companies. This dropped
exploration sharply. The government is now reversing course, but time
has been lost. Similarly in Malaysia, the fear of giving away too much
has delayed oil development for two years, though it is now getting back
into stride.
In many countries, with revenues running at several times past
levels, governments can meet all their commitments with less than the
capacity already in place. Venezuela is an especially interesting case.
During the last decade of private operation, exploration was at a very
low level, understandably so in view of the coming nationalization. But
1Economist, November 25, 1978, p. 11).
-
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the number of new-field exploratory wells in Venezuela fell from ten in
1973, to two per year in 1975-1977. During the first five months of
1978, only one new-field exploratory rig was at work. The reserve base
is runningdown. But the man in the street understandably thinks "I'm
all right, Jack" or the Spanish equivalent thereof, and is reluctant to
spend money for uncertain prospects of capacity which will not be used
for some time to come. Similarly, the vast hydrocarbon accumulation of
the Orinoco Belt (three or four trillion barrels in place) is today only
a geological fact. As in Canada, years of research and development will
be needed to make it into an economic asset. Hence its current reserves
must be put to zero.
In Mexico,1 some geologists' new concepts led to deeper drilling
in an old province and tremendous results. Here too the high oil prices
produced two contradictory pressures. Mexican believers in the "gap"
were at first dominant. Mexico could afford to hold oil far into the
21st century, so that the country never had to "do without." Others
argued that the oil and gas were a potential national asset which ought
to be made actual. That is now official policy, but the opposing school
is still powerful, and there is much opposition to large scale exports.
On the basis of published reports, Mexican fields already found
would permit a buildup of proved hydrocarbon reserves (about two thirds
liquids, one third gas) to about 45 billion barrels. But time is needed
for a vast deployment of men and machines. An estimate, presumably by
1The following is based on a current research project, and uses only
published data.
Im
20
the CIA, of 4-5 MBD of oil alone by 1980 or 1981, seems much too
optimistic.1 Attainable for 1985 might be about 5 MBD of petroleum
liquids plus half as much in equivalent gas, provided the policy of
hoarding does not gain the ascendant as the foreign-exchange position
improves, and provided also that the United States government refrain
from (1) high-level confrontations over the price of natural gas, or (2)
condescending "help" which the Mexicans do not need, or (3) scare talk
about wells running dry worldwide which, if it has any effect will make
them more reluctant to produce, or (4) attempts at "linking" of Mexican
exports with everything else that can be dragged in for high-level
superfluities.
This quick survey helps us to understand why the worldwide growth in
well drilling and completions, and in inflation-adjusted or "real"
production expenditures, has been.relatively modest since 1973.
Incentives for exploration are weak today. Especially since contracts
were used for bonfires in 1970-73, a good discovery means that the
sovereign landlord will revise the contract unilaterally; non-discovery
means dead-weight loss. An oil company needs to calculate the likely
return on all ventures taken together. The odds on finding may not have
changed recently, but the odds on making a profit, all else being equal,
are much less. Thereby the whole world is poorer, because oil and gas
that would be found and developed, to the profit of both companies and
governments, may remain forever unexploited.
New York Times, November 29, 1978, p. D1
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Communist exports. For the Soviet Union (and other East European
countries) the CIA forecast of large net imports in 1985 is far off
base. They cannot pay for large imports, nor need they. Soviet and East
European consumption has been notoriously high relative to GNP, because
they have no markets to enforce economical use. But dictatorships can
squeeze out substantial savings. Coal and nuclear will not be slowed by
environmental protests.
Soviet oil, to be sure, has no bright near-term future. It has for
years been beset by sharply rising costs. Since the CIA report,
production grew at 5.4 percent in 1977, and by 4.5 percent in the first
half of 1978: 3.6 percent growth is now planned for 1979.1 This
continuing slowdown holds, as yet, no hint of the impending sharp
turndown predicted there.2 Furthermore, if Soviet officials expected a
downturn, they ought to be preparing domestic and foreign opinion for it,
and so far they have not hinted at it.
Soviet gas production will grow at an accelerating rate. It is
clear now that the Russians have, over the last 10-20 years, gradually
mastered much of the harsh environment of Tyumen Province, to the point
where they have made a major start on turning its vast gas resources into
reserves. The industry consensus is that total Soviet hydrocarbon
10il & Gas Journal, December 11, 1978. The decrease in planned oil
growth is precisely offset by the increase in planned gas growth.
A recent forecast has Soviet oil production doubling by 1990, and
exports to Western Europe of 3.7 MBD in 1985. At least one American
oilman has found this credible,
Oil & Gas Journal, October 16, 1978. Such numbers are startling, and I
am not qualified to appraise them.
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exports will more likely grow than diminish.1
In China, even the years of turmoil did not prevent the rise of oil
output from 0.2 to a current 2.0 MBD (and 913,000 bd equivalent in
natural gas), and modest exports. In a radical change of course, the new
regime is now zealously seeking much more foreign technology and even
participation, and large exports of both oil and coal. Meyerhoff and
Willums, in their admirable survey, rightly scorn "the wild undocumented
claims" comparing China to the Middle East. They estimate that proved
reserves can be expanded to support production of 6.6 mbd; but we cannot
tell how much new capacity can be put in place by 1985. A responsible
estimate for 1985 exports is 800 tbd, of which 600 tbd to Japan. This
may be too low; in Japan, the 1987 target is 860 tbd. 2 Exports in 1990
should be much higher, drawing on fields unknown today and on substition
of local coal and even local manure-to-gas generation for exportable coal
and oil.
It is a grievous errnr to suppose that domestic "needs" will
dominate Soviet or Chinese oil use, leaving a "surplus" for exports.
This ignores comparative cost and benefit. Oil or gas exports at current
prices allow imports of goods and of technology which can do a lot more
for the economy than reserving an "adequate" amount for home use. On
10il & Gas Journal, May 28 and September 18, 1978.
2A.A. Meyerhoff and Jan-Olaf Willums, "Petroleum Geology and Industry of
the People's Republic of China, U.N. ESCAP, CCOP Technical Bulletin, vol.
10, 1976, pp. 103-312; Jayson Mugar, in New York Timnes, May 6, 1973, p.
29; Economist (London), February 18, 1978, p. 85; Septeminber 23, 1978, p.
95; Oil & Gas Journal, October 2, 1978. p. 72; Minister of International
Trade and Industry Komito, quoted in Tokyo Shimbun, September 10, 1978.
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balance, the odds are for larger Communist exports in 1985 than in 1977,
but the percentage of NCW supply will remain modest, probably near
today's 3 percent.
Questioning the consensus. The CIA report is the extreme statement
of a consensus view: there is over-capacity today, but soon it will turn
into shortage, and then the price will rise. The date of the crossover,
where "demand" exceeds "supply," is officially 1983.1 Unofficially, it
has kept sliding toward 1990, or past it. But that is only a detail
compared to agreement on a basic major premise: if excess capacity
continues, prices will be stable; if not, they will rise.
This consensus does not agree with history. In 1970-73, through
alternating surplus and tightness, government take at the Persian Gulf
went from 90 cents to $3. In December 1973 the Persian Gulf governments
issued their communique explaining why they thought $7 per barrel was a
reasonable take.2 By November 1974 that figure was above $10. Yet
excess producing capacity in 1974 was almost as great as it has been in
early 1978. Since then, there has been excess capacity and more price
increases. This would be impossible in a competitive market; we need to
look closely at the monopoly which rules oil today.
1Secretary Schlesinger, testimony, March 1978.
2Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, December 31, 1973.
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III. THE MULTI-GOVERNMENT OIL CARTEL1
Much of the voluminous discussion about oil supply in the 1980's has
recognized that there is no physical or economic barrier to producing all
that would be demanded at current prices, and more. The limits to supply
are instead in the policies of the producing nations. So far so good,
but the discussion tails off into vague allusions to "needs" for revenue,
which may not coincide with the "needs" of the consuming nations.
We can make a fresh start from two basic premises. First, the
producing nations will produce and sell the amount that best suits their
interests. Second, these nations know that in union there is strength,
and will act together as far as they can. If so, theyare a collective
monopoly, or cartel.
Political objectives irrelevant. We assume nothing about the
political or other objectives of the OPEC nations. But money serves
every conceivable economic or political objective: growth, consumption,
investment, armaments, influence, gaining friends and putting down
enemies, or whatever. The real problem is how to manage the wealth. But
even more important and difficult (or insoluble) is: how to find the way
toward maximum wealth.
1The following draws extensively on two published articles: "The World
Oil Cartel: Scarcity, Economics and Politics," in Quarterly Review of
Economics & Business, vol. 16, Summer 1976; and "Constraints on the World
Oil Monopoly Price," Resources & Energy, vol. 1, 1978.
. . .
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In search of optimum price. Given the actual (and prospective)
state of knowledge, I do not believe anyone can tell what price would be
the most profitable, over the short or long run, for the OPEC nations. I
do share the consensus that higher-than-current prices would mean higher
revenues, i.e., that demand is still in the inelastic range. Why, then,
don't these nations forthwith put the price up toward the optimum, where
demand is unit-elastic? (Past that point, where a one percent price rise
would mean a one percent loss of sales, further increases would mean
lower revenues.) Do they fear to raise prices because of excess capacity?
Two types of excess capacity. It is important to distinguish two
types of excess capacity. Day in day out, during the first half of 1978,
2 to 3 million barrels daily (MBD) were offered, in excess of purchases.
This current surplus put pressure on prices, which OPEC solidarity must
resist. Another 7 to 8 MBD could be produced. But fortunately for the
cartel, this reserve surplus is in the strong hands of the largest and
wealthiest producers. Saudi Arabia is now expanding capacity from near
12 to about 16 MBD,1 possibly less if demand remains sluggish. Despite
oversupply, expansion makes sense. It is a warning that if anyone starts
a price war, the Saudis will finish it. Nor is it a bad investment;
since the cost is so low.
So long as it is mostly in strong hands, excess capacity is no
barrier to raising price toward the point of maximum revenue. Yet from
late 1974 to mid-1977, the OPEC nations raised their take only a trifle
1petroleum Economist,.August1978; Oil & Gas Journal, June 26, 1978.1Petroleum Economist,.August 1978; Oi & Gas Journal, June 26, 1978.
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faster than world inflation.1 Since September 1977, they have been
confronted by an unexpected deterioration of the dollar, of nearly 10
percent (weighted by this country's trading partners), on top of general
inflation. This was an accident, and will be redeemed. Far more
important, how does one explain the 1974-77 stability in real price?
There is only one new factor to explain the change: the world
recession-stagnation.
Macro-economic effects. If we were talking about coffee or bauxite
or copper, etc., the producers would go forthwith to their best guess at
the monopoly price, recession or no recession. But oil is so large a
part of the total flow of world payments that large increases in the
price have disruptive and dangerous effects on the whole world monetary
and trading system. Higher oil prices in 1974 were great for sellers,
even with recession. Still-higher prices, and a sharper recession, would
not be better. When and as the world economy improves, there will be a
succession of price increases, none of them steep, but in the aggregate
large.
But there will be smaller increases even if the world economy
remains sluggish. This is because the current-account surplus of the
OPEC nations, which tends to make the world banking and monetary system
unstable and recession-prone, has shrunk from about $65 billion in 1974
1Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., World Financial Markets, February 1978. The
Economic Research Insttute for the Middle East (Tokyo) calculates that in
terms of export prices of manufactured goods, denominated in dollars,
real government take per barrel of "marker crude" peaked in the fourth
quarter of 1975, declining 9 percent by the fourth quarter of 1977.
Middle East Economic Survey, September 25, 1978.
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to around $15 billion this year.1 The OPEC nations have spent much
more of their income than anyone anticipated.2 The more they spend, and
the less foreign exchange they accumulate, the less vulnerable is the
world financial system, and the more free should the OPEC nations feel to
raise prices again. Then the world must sweat out another period of
waiting for surplus accumulation to moderate, then a fresh price increase
and so on indefinitely, step by cautious step.
Saudi Arabia, cartel backstop, and the need for cartel areement.
There is another reason why the OPEC nations will want to be gradual and
moderate. It is a valuable backstop to the cartel, that Saudi Arabia and
its neighbors (Kuwait, United Arab Emirates) can if need be retrench
deeply and Carry the burden of excess capacity while letting others
produce all-out. But they would rather not.
Suppose that Saudi Arabia agreed to let everyone else produce
all-out, and to restrict their output as much as necessary. Then further
price increases would restrain only their production. Others would
benefit by the price rise, they would bear the burden. Suppose the
"dominant group" of Saudi Arabia and the southern Gulf states account for
half of OPEC output, and they are willing to cut back output as needed.
Suppose also that the long-run elasticity of demand is in the
1For 1974-77, Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., World Financial Markets,
February 1978. For first-half 1978, the Bank of England Quarterly
estimates it at $6.4 billion; the figure in the text is a rough guess for
the whole year.
2With the possible exception of Theodore H. Moran, Oil Prices and the
Future of OPEC, (Resources for the Future, 1978). 
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neighborhood of -0.5, i.e., a proposed gradual 50 percent price increase
would lose only 18 percent of sales. The price rise would pay the others
handsomely, but the dominant group not at all:
Before Price Rise After Price Rise
Dominant Group Others Total Dominant Group Others Total
Sales volume 50 50 100 32 50 82
Price per unit 1 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.5
Revenue 50 50 100 47 75 122
Unless there can be some arrangement to let everybody benefit from
price increases, then make everybody share the burden of restricted
ouput, there will be no price increases. The Saudis can and will veto
any price increase from which they do not gain. The cartel is much
better off patching up some kind of deal or understanding, rough and
temporary, to let everybody share.
The fear of excessive loss of sales is amplified by te great
uncertainty about demand. Suppose the industry is geared to 1985
non-Communist output around 60 million barrels daily, and it appears to
be approaching a lower figure, say one million barrels daily less. That
is well within the normal range of uncertainty. But if Saudi Arabia is
down to somewhere near the .amount it can tolerate' a one MBD reduction is
not to be suffered.
Along the ad hoc trail: three problems. A formal scheme for OPEC
allocation or market sharing would be a dangerous divisive exercise every
month or quarter, with special meetings added. Hence the OPEC nations
II
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must ad hoc their way from one temporary accomodation to another, knowing
that what suits everyone today will gall some partners tomorrow. It is
an additional reason for OPEC to go slowly in raising prices, one step at
a time.
Price fixing without allocation has made for some sharp fluctuations
in the governments' market shares. The overpublicized squabble over the
"two-tier" system in early 1977 was only one incident in a continuing
problem. The relative values of various crude oils keep changing
incessantly because markets change. Hence, without a system of prompt
corresponding adjustments in oil prices, refiners move from one supplier
government to another in search of a better deal. The refining is done
mostly by producing companies. Time was when the producing margins were
wide enough to absorb lower realizations from some countries withou.t
pushing them into greater production in other countries. No longer:
their margins are now around 21 cents (Saudi Arabia) or 15 cents (Kuwait).
The multi-national companies are therefore, slowly becoming oil
buyers. They are still committed to large offtake of most world oil
supply, and are held in place largely by the savings of a large
continuous flow from production to ultimate sale. (These savings are
usually misnamed "access," that same irrelevant slogan.) Hence the
companies will not move freely from one supplying government to another,
in response to small changes in price. Yet they will move slowly, within
limits. For example, there is a current oversupply of light crudes.
North Sea production, where company margins are measured in dollars not
cents, is maximized at the expense of output in OPEC countries. This
destabilizes the price structure.
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Thus the cartel nations have three problems which must be solved
simultaneously: (1) crude oil price differentials, (2) company producing
margins, and (3) governments' market shares. Much thought and computer
time has been lavished on them, in vain. But the cartel has managed to
live with them, and probably will continue to.
At the end of 1976, for example, Saudi Arabia undercut the others by
increasing prices only 5 percent, thereby gaining sales and preference as
a possible future price laggard. In mid-1977, they matched the general
increase, and came out ahead of everybody else on the price change.
There will be many such incidents, each one unpredictable, in the
unceasing jockeying for position.
THREE LEGENDS ABOUT SAUDI ARABIA
(1) Saudi Arabia has tried to restrain prices. Nobody alleges this
for the period before the end of 1973. During 1974, the public record
shows that the Saudis were repeatedly the price leaders upward, the
Iranian "hawks" being glad to follow.1 When, as seen above, it was not
good business to raise "real" prices, they remained stable.
(2) Saudi Arabia would rather conserve its oil for future use.
"Oil in the ground is worth more han money in the bank." If that were
really true, nobody would produce any oil. Then the price would rise
immediately, to where oil would be worth producing. So the statement
cannot ever be true.
lPetroleum Intelligence Weekly, December 31, 1973; and March 11, June
17, November I 1, and ovember 25, 1974.
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-Saudi production of 8.5 MBD (the supposed "ceiling" which so
frightens American officials) is about 3 percent of proved reserves, 2
percent of proved-plus-probable, not to mention fields discovered but not
evaluated, and prospects identified but not explored. If the Saudis hold
to that 8.5 MBD ceiling, a barrel not produced today cannot be produced
before 2025 A.D.--or probably much later.
Considering the economic, technological, and political risks, 10
percent is not an excessive discount rate for future oil revenues, and at
10 percent, $12 from a barrel of oil sold today is better than $1,200
from a sale in 2025 A.D. Saudi Arabia restrains output today to maintain
the price today--a good reason, and the only one which makes sense.
(3) Saudi Arabia ould be better off producing less oil, but it
produces at current rates tb help the world economy. The claim that
Saudi Arabia is in business for the public good, for sweet charity, is so
extraordinary that it should be supported by extraordinarily strong
evidence. None is offered, except endless repetition. In fact, since
1973, while OPEC production has been static, Saudi production has
actually increased. Other nations would have been delighted if the
Saudis had cut back output, at least moderately, and so lessened the
burden of undesired wealth, which is being thrust upon them--they say.
In fact, they continue to demand that Aramco lift a minimum amount or pay
"heavy penalties."1 The service contract would have been signed long
ago had the Saudis given up that demand. 
1P.I.W., October 16, 1978; and see September 17, 1977.
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IV. THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE FUTURE WORLD OIL MARKET
Earlier, we saw why no great surge of OPEC output.is to be expected,
even at constant prices, since slow growth in non-OPEC production will
cut into a very slow-growing market.
Middle East output will expand to whatever the chief cartel nations
decide to ell. As we saw earlier (p. 16), providing reserves is no
problem. But it costs money to provide them. Given the slow-growing
demand, it is doubtful that reserves need be much increased.
Feedback of oil price increases on economic growth. However, we
cannot tell whether the growth of Middle East exports will go smoothly or
not, because the world economy will continue somewhat shaky. Faced by
chronic balance-of-payments deficits, and te inflationary impulse given
by higher oil prices, the big consuming countries tend to deflate their
economies, push exports and restrict imports.
It is uncomfortable to recall the consensus among economists, that
the 1929 recession was so persistently mishandled by monetary contraction
and blockages to world trade, that the dominoes kept falling, and there
was an unprecedented disaster.
I do not expect anything comparable. But we have not yet emerged
from a miniature replica of the stagnation of the 1930s. We must fear a
continued dragging of the world economy as the nations adapt badly to the
strain on the world monetary system imposed by past and future oil price
increases. Good macro-economic mangement, not a mythical energy or oil
shortage, is the policy problem. Not for the first time, I must admit to
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sympathy with the complaint of the OPEC nations that we ought not to
blame them for what we are doing to ourselves.
Cartel prospects. It is often said that by the middle 1980s (or
later) oil will be so scarce that the cartel will be obsolete. This is
simply wrong. No matter how scarce anything is, i.e., no matter what its
price in a free market, it always pays to monopolize it and raise the
price. But the cartel appears to be strong.
The larger cartelists around the Persian Gulf can easily control
output by force. Iran can limit shipments through the Straits of
Hormuz. Saudi Arabia can occupy close neighbors with current capacity of
6.6 MBD (Kuwait, Qatar, and the U.A.E.). Distances are short, local
populations scanty, the terrain ideal for a quick grab if the smaller
Gulf poducers do not do as they are told. The small necessary supply of
conventional arms is already in place.
For this reason, not even a sharp increase of non-OPEC production,
nor the most radical conservation, will break the cartel, nor tend to
lower world oil prices. At most, they would moderate the rate of oil
price increases.
The greater the accumulated wealth of the cartel nations, the less
the pressure on any of them to reduce prices to obtain more revenues,
also the easier for them to reduce output, perhaps setting off another
buying panic, to scare the consumers properly when raising prices. The
contrast is dramatic with the copper-producing nations, whose
organization (CIPEC) has been quite ineffective. The need of CIPEC
*·
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nations for revenue forces them to compete for more sales and hence
forces down the price of copper.
Therefore, the cartel's prospects look good, and "real" prices
should increase, but the amount is very uncertain. Earlier, we saw that
if the smaller cartelists could not be prevented from increasing output
to the limit, the larger producers could hold all the excess capacity,
but it would not pay them to raise prices as much.
Two dangers to the cartel. Consumer-country taxation of oil
products can divert into their own treasuries the sums now going to the
OPEC producers.1 The OPEC nations have long known that the more of
what can be extracted from consumers is kept at home, the less is left
for them.2 Consumer countries.may do inadvertently what they would
never do deliberately, and year after year raise oil product taxes or
levy import tariffs, in an effort to check consumption and imports.
Another danger to the cartel is that the United States, acting
alone, could divert large sums from them into our Treasury. We could put
import entitlements up for monthly auction by sealed bids, with no
limitation on resale and transfer of tickets. Some 200 million tickets,
worth nearly $2-1/2 billion, would be up for grabs month after month.
Cheating by OPEC nations to get more sales would be easy. Tickets
could be bought anonymously through front men. A cartel country would
1For a brief explanation, see Petroleum Economist, September 1977; a
formal proof is in "Constraints on the World Monopoly Price," op. cit.
2See, for example, the statement of the Secretary General of OPEC, in
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, May 16, 1977.
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sell at the current price, and not even the customers would know the
seller was rebating to the U.S. Treasury through buying tickets. Any
country needing extra revenues would buy more tickets to sell more
barrels, and any country which lost business could recoup itself by
buying tickets, jostling other cartelists. Fear of loss would probably
be more powerful than hope of gain, for some OPEC nations sell this
country a third or more of total sales: Libya (31), Indonesia (36),
Venezuela (45), Nigeria (49), Algeria (60).1 Even with no excess
capacity, they have an immediate decision: either they buy tickets or
dump on the world market, breaking prices there.
With no interference in industry logistics, and with a handful of
employees administering the auction, the United States would pocket
substantial revenues. The quota auction wotuld only fail if each and
every cartel nation would resist temptation indefinitely, month after
month. Only one nation need defect to get the process started.
The Economic Task Force of the then President-elert Carter
recommended such a plan.2 It has not been heard of since. When it was
explained to Secretary Schlesinger, he said: "It would work. But do we
1Exports to the United States are as reported by D.O.E. Two-thirds of
U.S. products imported from the Netherland Antilles are assumed to be
from Venezuelan crude, as in 1976, the latest year of available data.
Total exports are reckoned as production in the first half of 1978, minus
the proportion of domestic onsumption to production in 1976, again the
most recent year available. The ratio of domestic consumption was
probably higher this year.
20il & Gas Journal, January 10, 1977.
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dare let it work?"l The answer is of course No, but the option is
there.
Either a tariff or a quota auction would divorce the internal price
level of the consuming countries from the world price level. Higher
internal prices may be desirable, to reduce pollution and congestion, and
encourage the development of new energy sources. But high prices paid to
Middle East countries are an unmitigated economic burden. Moreover, the
higher the price, the less the security of supply, and the greater the
political dangers.
The "price crunch" of 1983 or 1988 or 199X or .... Official policy
statements today de-emphasize the "gap," which "of course" cannot happen
in the real world. If so, then "access" and "availability" and the
'special relationship" are also unreal.
The perceived danger now is that the current OPEC surplus will soon
dwindle and disappear. Then the price rise will be sudden, steep, and
disorderly, with nations frantically bidding and elbowing each other out
of the way. But this assumes that a certain predetermined maximum amount
will be available from OPEC producers. In fact, OPEC looks at the
residual demand for its oil (Table I line 5), and makes its decisions
accordingly. They will engineer a gradual price rise or a price crunch,
as they think best.
1 Quoted in ew Republic, May 21, 1977. Some other parts of the meeting
are not accurately reported, to my recollection.- See Washington Post,
July 10, 1977.
37
The forthcoming price increases will probably be gradual and
moderate. First, the cartel nations need to adapt to uncertain demand
and difficult market sharing. It is only sensible to go ahead slowly,
testing the markets. Second, it would pay some high cost non-OPEC and
OPEC producers to begin postponing new capacity, and it would pay so,,
actually to shut in, years before any price rise.1 It would take very
little of such postponement or cutbacks to wipe out a dwindling current
surplus (p. 25) and get the price started rising. For both buyers and
sellers it makes sense to make new contracts at higher prices, smoothing
out the price increase.
The third reason to expect only moderate price increases is large
excess capacity in a few dominant countries. It would be bad for OPEC
generally and Saudi Arabia particularly to set off a world economic and
political crisis by forcing oil price to gyrate wildly upward while they
sit on their capacity. They are large holders of assets in the consuming
countries. They had better not try consumer patience too severely. And
they can extract economic or non-economic payment for their goodwill.
But--it would not be the first time that an avoidable misfortune,
which everyone wanted to avoid, arrived anyway because of mismanagement
or everyone waiting on everyone else. The excess producing capacity may
not be matched by surface installations, or loading facilities, and it
may take months or years to provide them. Given an pward bump in
consumption, inventory building, a dollop of panic, and we have a
crisis. The cartel mechanism may be wound too tight.
1See "World Supply and Demand", Appendix 2, for a discussion.
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Lessons from Iran (as of December 1, 1978). The lowered production
wiped out the current surplus (p. 25), and spot prices rose by roughly
10-15 percent. Reflecting the general belief that Iranian production
would be restored before too long, there was only a minor impact, in
mid-November, on dealings for the first quarter of 1979.1
To a limited extent, reserve surplus was made available. Saudi
Arabian production increased to about 10 million barrels daily. But when
Aramco asked for permission to increase output further, the Saudi
government refused.2 This was not a reckless act. It was cartel
management. If theSaudis and neighbors took off the lid altogether, it
might bring back the current surplus and put prices back under pressure.
To hold tightly to the ceiling might make the price jump. This
fine-tuning will be needed every time there is an unexpected market
development. In any given emergency, the odds are in favor of orderly
matching of output with demand to keep the price stable and avoid a
crisis. The odds on avoiding a crisis every single time during the next
decade are not so good. Cartel supply is inherently insecure.
1P.I.W., November 13, 1978; marketers expected "small premiums" for
lighter grades.
2Wall Street Journal, November 13, 1978, p. 4.
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V. OPTIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST OIL PRODUCERS
Middle East oil exports to the United States in the 1980s will be
lower than today, although total American imports will grow. But-Middle
East exports in the world market will probably be higher, and hence, .S.
exports to Middle East nations will continue to grow, strengthening their
support in this country. The Middle East nations will decide world price
and output.
If we rule out the option of using our buying power to weaken the
cartel, there is nothing the United States can do to influence these
price-output decisions. "Dialogue" and "cooperation" and "exchange of
views" waste time and prevent thinking.
Most of these regimes, most notably Saudi Arabia, cannot do without
our military protection, but this gives us no bargaining power because we
must protect them for our own sake. We could stop selling them arms, or
stop the Corps of Engineers and American companies fronm doing big
construction projects, but they can absorb the economic cost of changing
suppliers. To forbid or limit their investment in the United States
would be not only offensively discriminatory, but also only a minor
economic irritant. The industrial nations are not united to control
supplies of food or industrial products, hence cannot withhold supply nor
raise price. (Nor, in my opinion, should they try.)
We have no carrots any more than we have sticks. Assistance with
Middle East economic development is simply payment in kind instead of
money--awkward and wasteful as any other kind of barter.
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As for political goodwill: when a policy maker says that the world
oil shortage began in June 1967, he is simply uninformed. Peace in the
Middle East, devoutly to be wished, promises nothing for oil supply or
price. In fact, the overflowing revenues of some oil producers have
complicated peacemaking. The Saudis and neighbors have "agreed to
contribute to a $3.5 billion kitty to finance Arab opponents of the Camp
David agreements...because, they contend, the U.S. sold out Arab
interests at Camp David." Mr. Sadat was incensed by the betrayal, as he
saw it;1 but he who pays the piper calls the tune.
Whatever we do to please the oil producing governments is useless
because there is no way to insure that they do anything in return. Any
agreement we made with these nations on oil would be void for vagueness
and redundancy. A promise to produce "enough oil for our needs" is
senseless because there will always be eough--at their price. Ah
agreement that actually named prices and outputs would be far out of line
with economic realities because we cannot predict supply and demand.
Most important of all, an agreement can only be enforced by
competition or law or both. If anyone persistently violates his word,
people will go elsewhere, and after a while he is out of business. Or a
court will order him to perform or go to jail, or lose his assets. But
the oil monopoly has suppressed competition, and sovereign states are
beyond any law. Any agreement is truly "inoperative." The record of our
currying favor with oil producing nations proves it.
1Wall Street Journal, December 14, 1978, p. 14. New York Times,
November 21, 19/8, p. All.
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The record on agreements and understandings. When the Libyans
opened Pandora's box in 1970, the United States government insisted on
giving them what they wanted. The then managing director of Royal
Dutch/Shell has stated that this insistence was never explained to hi.,.
It has never been explained to anyone else. But the apparent aim, to
insure the goodwill of Saudi Arabia and other producers has been the
great obsession of American policy makers. Our State Department claimed
credit for the Tehran agreement of February 1971, effective for five
years. It lasted about five months, and after repeated violations, it
was finally repudiated by the Saudis in September 1973, before the Middle
East war.1
The Saudi boycott of the United States in 1973 was a violation of
their treaty of commerce, which the Nixon administration covered up,
along with the withholding of Saudi oil from the United States Navy. The
then ambassador to Saudi Arabia urged American citizens to pressure our
government into acceding to Saudi demands, and he warned publicly that
fuel oil would be critically short at the U.S. East Coast in a matter of
days if the boycott continued. This wild misstatement was likely to
panic uninformed citizens who knew only that lack of fuel oil meant lack
1Multinational Corporations and American Foreign Policy. Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92d Congress, 2d Sess. On Libya, see
vol. 5, p. 6; vol. 8, pp. 771, 773 (1975). (Hereafter cited as Church
Hearings.) See also M.A. Adelman, The World Petroleum Market, op. cit.,
Ch. VIII; Anthony Sampson, The Seven Sisters (1975), pp. 211-215. See
also "A Diplomatic Situation Where Oil and Hauteur Just Didn't Mix,"
Washington Post, March 14, 1976, and "How OPEC Came To Power,' Forbes,
April 15, 1976. Platt's Oilgram News Service, February 18, 1971. Middle
East Economic Survey, September 7, 1973.
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of electric power and loss of jobs.1
In June 1974, two days after our government signed an executive
agreement for Saudi-American economic cooperation, the price was raised,
retroactively, by $1.35. On at least two later occasions, the Secretary
of State said he had assurances of lower prices; both times the price
went up.2 The Saudis were the price leaders upward (above, p. ). In
mid-1974, they announced an auction to bring down prices, were praised
widely, and then cancelled the auction. Our government believed that
OPEC would lower prices "because it was under the thumb of the Saudis and
the Saudis believed in lower prices. Sadly...prices still went up."
Soon thereafter, in October 1974, another promise: they would not permit
output to be reduced. By March 1975, disappointed American officials
were complaining that the Saudis had "pulled the rug from under them" by
allowing reduced production.3
This record of broken promises proves not any original sin or Saudi
bad character but only that we cannot hold a sovereign monopolist to his
word.
OPEC is good for you. Our government ignores the past, and we are
condemned to repeat it. In 1972 the State Department called for $10
oil-about $14.25 in 1978 dollars. 4 Today: "Huge Oil Price Rise Benefited
U.S." One of the chief alleged benefits, incidentally, was a stronger
lChurch Hearings, vol. 5, p. 6; New York Times, Nov. 10, 1973
2New York Times, June 9, 10, .11, 1974; New York Times, October 13, 1974;
Oil & Gas Journal, October 21 and December 23, 1974.
3Economist, August 23, 1975, p. 63; Oil & Gas Journal, March 17, 1975.
4New York Times, April 16, 1972.
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dollar. Since the Administration says it wants higher oil prices, it is
logical to have "unprecedented closeness in the Middle East."1
It is equally logical to "caution that the United States cannot
shift to Mexican oil so fast that it disrupts carefully nurtured
relationships in the Middle East." 2 Why we should slow down imports
from Mexico deserves a little reflection and discussion.
Despite this "unprecedented closeness"--or maybe because of it--the
disturbances in Iran caught the U.S. government by surprise, like the
1969 revolution in Libya, and others past and future. (In a forthcoming,
publication, Professor Robert B. Stobaugh quotes "an experienced Saudi
watcher...with years of exposure to different strata of Saudis, including
the highest levels of the royal family": "'I judge the Government's
chance of survival for a half dozen years to be quite good and for a
dozen years, fairly good. But there could be a successful revolution
this evening."')
We have been quite unable to influence events in Iran, as in Libya,
Saudi Arabia, or elsewhere. Moreover, no Middle East producer government
is democratic. Opposing interests and opinions can only be settled by
force. Therefore "closeness" with any government merely makes us the
enemy of those out of power.
1 Washington Post, July 1O, 1977; "A Hard Choice: More Recession--or
More Expensive OTl," by James Cook, Forbes, March 20, 1978; "A Primer on
International Energy Policy," The Energy Daily, April 3, 1978.
2New York Times, November 29, 1978, p. D1.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS t
In some obvious sense, the United States and the Middle East are
'interdependent," though the words as usual, means different things to
different people. But there is nothing we can do (unless we deliberately
undermine the cartel) to influence the price and supply of Middle East
oil. Lower imports will simply mean lower Middle East output to maintain
the price. The richer the producing nations become, the easier for them
to reduce output; hence the greater the insecurity of supply.
We can, however, do much to improve the atmosphere in which both oil
policy and macro-economic policy is formed, in this country and
elsewhere. (1) Avoid protectionism, and don't deflate the economy to
reduce oil imports. (2) Repudiate the scare talk, which grows
increasingly farfetched, of shortages and gaps and the wells drying up.
(3) Avoid sermons or entreaties to OPEC on how they owe us enough oil at
a not-too-high price, as well as the bluff and bluster that made us so
ridiculous in 1974. (4) Admit that there is not now and never was any
Saudi-American special relationship. Ourt friends in Europe and Asia will
at first probably view this avowal as a Yankee trick, to avoid a fair
sharing of the "special relationship." The easy way would be to sell
them shares of the Emperor's new clothes. But, long term, honesty is the
best policy.
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* * *
In 81 B.C., some Chinese scholars were permitted to argue to an
imperial Lord Grand Secretary that the government salt and iron
monopolies should be abolished. The gist of a lengthy dialogue:
The Scholars: We have set forth the difference between peace and
danger, profit and harm...
The Lord Grand Secretary:...Poverty-stricken bumpkins and their
stupid wives know nothing of the cares of statecraft.1
Not much has changed in 2060 years.
lEsson M. Gale, ed., Discourses on Salt and Iron: a Debate on State
Control of Commerce and Industry in Ancient China (reprinted 1973), pp.
ix, 37.
The enclosed paper was solicited by the Congressional Research Service
in the Summer of 1978 for a compendium volume to be published in 1979.
A draft was delivered in November, and the present (final) report
shortly thereafter. After several un-returned telephone calls, I was
told in June 1979 that the paper would be excluded from the compendium
because C.R.S. had been unable to obtain a balancing or opposing view.
It is a flattering suggestion, that nobody can be found to state an
opposing view. Perhaps however, Congress and the public should be
allowed to make up their minds. At any rate, it is sent to you for
what interest it may have.
